Cyber space as a cross-cutting threat

The new Report on Switzerland's security policy contains a detailed presentation of Switzerland's security policy environment. It analyzes global security policy trends and the threats and dangers relevant to Switzerland. The report concludes that there have been marked changes in the threat situation in recent years. This applies in particular to the sustained deterioration in relations between the West and Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, the intensification of the threat posed by jihadist terrorism, and the extent of illegal activities and abuses in cyber space. The report notes that overall, the threats and dangers have become even more complex, even more interconnected and more confusing. A particular challenge for Switzerland's security lies in the combination or concatenation of the various threats and dangers.

Also part of the situation analysis are the organizations and agreements relevant to Switzerland's security policy. The international organizations (OSCE, NATO, EU, Council of Europe, UN, Interpol) and agreements (e.g. in the field of disarmament) relevant to Switzerland's security policy are described and the possibilities for increased security policy cooperation are identified.

How is cyberspace addressed?

The last report summarized the threat in the cyber space from the perspective of attacks on information and communication infrastructures. This report takes a different approach. Informatics permeates virtually all areas of life; and wherever widely networked informatics is applied, there is a risk that the virtual space of this networking, cyberspace, will be abused: The threat in cyberspace is a cross-cutting threat. To some extent, it creates newer threats, but more importantly, it intensifies existing threats. For example, it facilitates espionage, intensifies the threat of supply disruptions through the possibility of foreign interference with critical infrastructure, and gives criminals additional tools. Therefore, cyber threats are not presented as a separate category in this report, but as a complementary and increasingly important component of other threats and hazards.

For a few technologically leading states, the IT networking of virtually all databases and technical control systems and, in particular, the concentration of the technical development of network components in a few companies have created opportunities for even deeper intrusions. These range from the manipulation of industrial control systems to practically world-wide communications surveillance.

Certain states are in a position to influence the production of hardware and software. By gaining access to programming - and here in particular to updates of network components and operating systems or the artificial weakening of encryption systems - it is possible for them to intervene directly in the systems. A potential attacker thus no longer has to overcome network hurdles or firewalls, but is already in the company network, namely in the hardware or software produced by foreign companies. Since no malicious code foreign to the system is used in the process and the manipulation is part of the delivered system, it is very difficult for the victim to recognize that an attack is taking place at all given the complexity of systems today, according to the 125-page report.

Security policy goals defined

The second part of the report describes the orientation of Switzerland's strategy (of course, "cyber" also appears regularly in the strategy part). It is about how the security policy means are to be used to achieve the goals and thus serve the security policy interests. To this end, the interests and goals are first defined and then the orientation of Switzerland's security policy strategy is described. The substantive components of this strategy are cooperation, self-reliance and engagement. It is explained what these three core concepts mean in practice and how they are applied and combined for the most effective and efficient security policy.

Based on the strategy, the means for its implementation are described. The principles according to which the security policy instruments are used and the concrete contributions they make to the prevention, defense and management of the individual threats and dangers are shown. The aim is to establish a direct link to the individual threats and dangers and to describe the tasks and the interaction of the instruments in a concrete and clear manner. Finally, it is shown which adjustments and measures are necessary or already initiated for the individual instruments in order to be able to provide the required services in the future.

Cooperation in the Swiss Security Network

The last part of the report deals with security policy management at the federal and cantonal levels and the related cooperation within the Swiss Security Network. In particular, the findings from the pilot phase and evaluation of the Swiss Security Network as well as the first Security Network exercise are presented. It is noted that the Swiss Security Network, which was launched in 2010, has basically proven its worth, and reference is made to selective adjustments that were made following the evaluation and assessment of the 2014 Security Network exercise. This section is also not without "cyber". After all, the threat in cyberspace is a cross-cutting threat.

Source: Confederation, DDPS