Regulatory authority reprimands intelligence service
The supervisory authority reprimands the Federal Intelligence Service: There is room for improvement above all in the area of data processing, especially with regard to its organization and processes. In some cases, for example, too much data was kept for too long or reports were written carelessly.
The supervisory authority for intelligence activities (AB-ND) conducted a total of 19 audits at the intelligence services in 2019, resulting in 63 recommendations that the AB-ND addressed to the head of the Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS). The implementation of these recommendations could further reduce existing risks and increase efficiency, it said.
More transparency
The AB-ND sees potential for improvement at the Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) above all in the area of data processing. The FIS must be able to explain transparently why and what information on individuals is processed in its information systems. The FIS should also be held to high standards in terms of order and deletion discipline. Improvements would be appropriate here. The AB-ND has also established on the basis of random checks that the FIS does not keep any dossiers on politicians in its business management system solely on the basis of their political activity, as is reported.
In 2019, the AB-ND began reviewing the FIS's cooperation with the cantons. It reportedly reviewed the cantonal intelligence services (KND) in Bern, Geneva, Graubünden, Jura and Schaffhausen. The AB-ND had developed a standard audit for this purpose, which would be applied in further audits of the KNDs in the coming years.
In the area of procurement measures subject to approval (GeBM) and operations, AB-ND conducted five audits. The number of persons affected by a GeBM was negligibly small compared to the total population of Switzerland. The AB-ND was of the opinion that this most invasive means of the FIS was used proportionately. The FIS could intervene deeply in the fundamental rights of the persons concerned, and in this respect the tendency to use it with restraint was appropriate.
Military intelligence areas
The two military intelligence sectors, the Center for Electronic Operations (ZEO) and the Military Intelligence Service (MND), have narrower responsibilities than the intelligence service. For the two services, there is a certain dependence on the FIS. For them, it is a matter of positioning themselves vis-à-vis the FIS, filling niches optimally and optimizing synergies.
The audited entities are obliged to be transparent vis-à-vis the supervisory authorities. AB-ND is given access and insight into documents, processes, and premises that are not only not accessible to the public, but are also deliberately protected from the public. All audited bodies had always granted AB-ND such access in all situations. In the current activity report, the AB-ND passes on some of this transparency and also explains the background of intelligence activities. With its work, AB-ND wanted to contribute to eliminating or at least minimizing risks in connection with intelligence activities, while at the same time respecting and observing the fundamental rights of people living in Switzerland.
The revelations relating to Crypto AG do not fall within the 2019 reporting period and are therefore not part of the activity report.
Source: Federal Government, Activity Report here
