Learning from Fire Disasters

We learn not only from disasters, but also through them. «Today’s damage is tomorrow’s standard»—this is the closing line of an ARD report on the Kaprun fire disaster. This article aims to highlight, for some of the largest fire disasters of recent decades, the small and often trivial causes that led to enormous problems.

Ford Plant in Cologne, October 20, 1977

The largest single insurance claim to date—fortunately involving only property damage—in German history occurred in Cologne. Ford’s central spare parts warehouse for Europe burned down largely despite its sprinkler system—thereby damaging the reputation of sprinkler technology for years to come. One thing is clear: the products in storage were increasingly being switched from non-combustible to combustible materials, and the use of highly flammable packaging was also on the rise. In addition, a hydraulic line may have burst, and the oil that spurted out caused the fire to spread too quickly and become too intense.

Lessons: First, the maintenance company must conduct a critical annual review to determine whether the system can still handle the fire loads—no uncritical rubber-stamping. Second, a sprinkler system should ideally be designed to be one or two levels higher to allow for flexibility with regard to the stored goods. Retrofitting is usually not possible—only a complete replacement.

Explosion at the Rolandsmühle in Bremen, February 6, 1979 – 14 dead

The Rolandsmühle produced flour—a material that is non-flammable yet can still trigger explosions. This is possible due to the fine particle size of the flour and the thermal reaction of each individual dust particle when heated. A fire triggered a small deflagration, followed by further dust clouds—until the largest flour silo burst and the entire facility was destroyed by a final, massive explosion. Some of the victims could not be found.

Teaching: Dust is inherently extremely dangerous—especially when it is very fine, becomes airborne, and is ignited. This applies to both small and large quantities, and is virtually independent of the material: whether it is pollen, paper, wood, metal, or plastic dust. Even the slightest sources of energy, such as static electricity, can ignite them. They must therefore be bound, vacuumed up, moistened, and, if possible, automatically captured at the source.

London Underground Fire, King’s Cross, November 18, 1987 – 31 dead

One of the oldest subway stations in the world, home to the first escalator—which was made of wood at the time. Fine dust and grease that had accumulated under the escalator over decades were apparently ignited by a smoldering match. The movement of the escalator provided a source of oxygen. There was no fire safety plan in place.

Teaching: Cleanliness and technical maintenance, as well as the systematic replacement of outdated equipment, would have helped prevent this—but not training for users, since their behavior cannot be controlled.

Düsseldorf Airport, April 11, 1996 – 17 dead

Work involving fire hazards triggered the catastrophic fire. Emergency responders, who were unprepared, were overwhelmed. The lack of structural fire barriers, fire protection systems, and organizational fire safety measures allowed the fire to take such a devastating course.

Lessons: Smoke detectors must also be installed in raised floors and suspended ceilings. Combustible insulation materials are generally considered a risk. For fire-hazardous work, critical site inspections must be conducted in advance, and a fire watch with appropriate fire extinguishing equipment must be on site. Full sprinkler systems in such buildings are now state of the art. Structural fire protection means confining a fire to a single area. Incidentally, the lessons learned from Düsseldorf led to a truly well-protected new building—and to the preventive retrofitting of the Frankfurt/Main International Airport.

Kaprun Mountain Railway, November 11, 2000 – 155 Dead in a Matter of Minutes

A space heater intended for residential use—bearing a clear warning stating «Do not install in vehicles»—was placed inside the cab directly in front of a hydraulic line. The unit had an insufficiently secure mounting and plastic fan blades. This resulted in a fire, a deflagration, and many thousands of cubic meters of toxic and deadly hot smoke. Since there was no smoke extraction system in the narrow tunnel, only a few survived—those who were able to escape downward through smashed windows. Most fled upward—and suffocated.

Lessons: Changes to technical equipment require a professional risk assessment. A fire safety plan must ensure that incipient fires in confined spaces can be detected and extinguished immediately. And it must ensure that fires do not occur in the first place.

Nightclub in Gothenburg, October 29, 1998 – 63 dead

There was a second escape route—but it was blocked by flammable furniture. A teenager who had been turned away by the bouncer tried in vain to enter the nightclub that way. Out of frustration, he set the furniture on fire—certainly without intending to kill anyone. The blocked door failed to hold, smoke poured in, and the deadly danger was recognized only too late.

Lessons: Escape routes must be kept clear at all times. Fire alarms are a good idea, as are fire-rated doors leading to critical areas.

Nightclub in Amsterdam, January 1, 2001 – 14 dead

Sparklers set fire to highly flammable decorations that were present in large quantities for the New Year's Eve celebration.

Teaching: Decorations in public gathering places must be non-combustible or, at a minimum, flame-retardant. Ignition sources must be strictly avoided—a lesson that, 25 years later, had apparently not been learned during the fire in Crans-Montana.

Event Farm in Schneizelreuth, May 23, 2015 – 6 dead

The farm, which was several hundred years old, was not designed to accommodate 48 people, some of whom were intoxicated. Forty-two of them spent the night on the first floor, and six in the attic above. There was no second escape route there—and neither floor had a functioning primary escape route that even remotely complied with current Bavarian state building codes. People on the first floor saved themselves by making dangerous jumps from the balcony.

Teaching: Every occupied area must have a primary and a suitable secondary escape route on the same level—positioned so that a single fire does not render both impassable. If many people are at risk, the secondary escape route must be structurally provided. In such cases, a ladder provided by the fire department is not sufficient. Exterior staircases may seem visually intrusive—but they are considered particularly safe because they cannot become filled with smoke.

Grenfell Tower, London, June 14, 2017 – 72 dead

This public housing building was renovated purely for aesthetic purposes—but not in terms of fire safety. The facade insulation was combustible (which is prohibited in Germany for high-rise buildings), doors leading to escape routes were wedged open, and hallways and stairwells were littered with trash. The window openings where they met the insulation were not sealed off. A fire in one apartment spread rapidly up the facade at night—and filled the only structural escape route with deadly smoke.

Lessons: Structural fire protection must be taken seriously—it’s not about aesthetics, but about safety. Propped-open doors are unacceptable; hallways and stairwells must be kept completely free of combustible materials. Two emergency stairwells—required in Germany for buildings 60 m or taller—make it virtually impossible for smoke to fill these escape routes to the point of rendering them impassable.

Bar in Crans-Montana, January 1, 2026 – 40 dead

The investigation is still ongoing, so we will not comment on it here.

Lessons: If you have a solid organizational structure, take fire loads and ignition sources into account or eliminate them during the risk assessment, and provide sufficiently wide, unobstructed exits on every level, fires will not occur. And therefore, there will be no fatalities.

Conclusion

We don’t really need any new or even stricter regulations. We simply need to be familiar with the existing ones and put them into practice. Fire safety is that simple—it could be that simple. But the pursuit of profit and a failure to take regulations seriously will likely continue to result in fire-related deaths.

As Edward Murphy once said: Anything that can go wrong will go wrong—sooner or later. We just don't know when, where, or to what extent. That makes it all the more important:

• Are you familiar with the fire safety requirements under building codes, insurance regulations, and occupational safety laws?.
• Compare the target and actual figures.
• Classify violations—what must be corrected immediately, what within four weeks, and what can be tolerated in the longer term.
• Conduct regular inspections and checks.

Zero tolerance for dangerous situations. After all, whoever is responsible for a building is also responsible for the people inside it.